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GAMING THE HATCH-WAXMAN SYSTEM: HOW
PIONEER DRUG MAKERS EXPLOIT THE LAW TO
MAINTAIN MONOPOLY POWER IN THE
PRESCRIPTION DRUG MARKET
Elizabeth Powell-Bullock*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, Congress enacted the landmark Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act, or the "Hatch-Waxman Act."' The twin goals
of the Act were to encourage more pharmaceutical research and development
of breakthrough or "blockbuster" drugs and to make available less expensive
generic equivalents.2 The Act provided market exclusivity periods for the
sale of brand name drugs, granted patent extensions to pioneer drugs, and
established new procedures for the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA")
to approve generic drugs.3 By balancing the interests of brand name and
generic drug makers in this three-pronged approach, the Hatch-Waxman Act
was a common sense formula for producing the best and most affordable
medicines for health care consumers in America.
Eighteen years later, this system has fallen out of balance due to the
aggressive manipulation of the Hatch-Waxman Act's provisions in a health
care environment in which prescription drug use has grown exponentially in
recent years. By finding innovative ways to invoke the Act's market
exclusivity and patent extension provisions and to create anti-competitive
agreements with potential generic competitors, many pioneer drug makers
have ensured their continued domination of the prescription drug market.
Moreover, by devoting much of their revenues to direct-to-consumer
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1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(codified in sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.). The congressional sponsors are
Senator Orrin Hatch and Representative Henry Waxman.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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advertising ("DTC") campaigns, these same companies have contributed to
the high consumer demand for, and often doctor-prescribed, name brand
drugs instead of generic equivalents. Together, these legal and marketing
efforts have delayed the availability of less expensive, generic drugs, thereby
thwarting one of the two Hatch-Waxman Act goals. Moreover, these
industry activities have spurred intense congressional debates on the
inaccessibility of prescription drugs, advocacy groups lobbying for access to
cheaper drugs, and consumers becoming more burdened with expensive drug
bills.
This article examines the evolution of the prescription drug approval
process that culminated in the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984.4
It explains the three-part system established by the Act and how each
operates in today's health care market. It probes the way in which pioneer
pharmaceutical companies increase their blockbuster drug profits through
aggressive, legal, and sometimes illegal, maneuvers. It also examines the
effect of pervasive direct-to-consumer advertising on health care
expenditures and prescription use. Arguing that the pioneer drug makers are
responsible for inflated prices that make prescription drugs inaccessible for
many Americans, the article closes with some policy recommendations. It
concludes that effective reform of the Hatch-Waxman Act involves setting
higher standards for patent infringement suits, eliminating the automatic
thirty-month stay on generic competition, discouraging excessive DTC
advertising, and providing more information to patients and doctors on new
brand name drugs.
II. THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG APPROVAL PROCESS BEFORE THE HATCH-
WAXMAN ACT
Throughout the twentieth century, Congress imposed increasing
oversight over the development and availability of pharmaceutical products.
Initially, congressional concerns focused on drug safety, and soon after, on
efficacy. By 1984, Congress wanted not only to ensure safety and efficacy,
but also wanted to stimulate innovation in new blockbuster drugs and to
encourage financial accessibility of these medications.'
4. Id.
5. Id.
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A. Reforming the Statute to Shift From Safety Only to Safety Plus Efficacy
and Affordability
In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act to prohibit
manufacturers from introducing misbranded and adulterated foods and drugs
into interstate commerce.6 In 1938, Congress passed the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act to add quality standards for food and drugs and to
require proof of safety to obtain FDA approval.7 The Act gave the FDA
authority over the labeling of both prescription and over-the-counter
pharmaceutical drugs, but it did not grant the agency control over drug
advertising, which remained with the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").'
In 1962, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris Amendments to the
original 1938 Act, which made safety standards more stringent, opened the
door to generic competition, and transferred authority for prescription drug
advertisements from the FTC to the FDA.9 Prior to 1962, a new drug was
automatically approved if the FDA did not reject it within 180 days for
failure to be safe for its suggested use.' ° After 1962, the stricter safety
testing requirements for new drugs included substantial evidence of efficacy
and more expansive human clinical trials to ensure that the pharmaceutical
products cured or treated the ailment for which they were prescribed."
Following this heightened standard, the approval process took as long as
6. Pure Food and Drugs Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, Chap. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
7. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified, as
amended, at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395 (2000)). See Paul M. Wax, Elixirs, Dilutents, and the Passage of the 1938
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 122 ANN. INTERN. MED. 456 (1995) (describing how Congress passed
this legislation in response to the Elixir Sulfanilamide tragedy). See also Paul M. Wax, Elixir Sulfanilamide-
Massengill Revisited, 36 VET. HuMAN TOXICOLOGY 561 (1994).
8. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, supra note 7. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codi-
fied, as amended, at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395).
9. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified, as amended, at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-381). The statute is named after its congressional sponsors. See generally Louis Lasagna,
Congress, the FDA, and New Drug Development: Before and After 1962, 32 PERSPECTIVES IN BIOLOGY &
MED., 322, 330-31 (1989) (explaining the 1962 amendments and how Congress passed this legislation in
response to the Thalidomide disaster in Europe and the United States).
10. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, supra note 7. See also Lisa C. Will, Note, Accelerated FDA
Approval of Investigational New Drugs: Hope for Seriously Ill Patients, 94 DICK. L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1990)
(explaining that the passage of the Kefauver-Harris amendments marked the beginning of a new era of en-
hanced, centralized FDA regulation of the new drug approval process, which led to slower drug approval).
11. Drug Amendments of 1962, supra note 9. Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified, as
amended, at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-355(d)(e)). See also William M. Brown, A "Highly Artificial Act ofInfringe-
ment, " Indeed, But it Can Still Cost You Attorneys' Fees... Comment on Yamanouchi v. Danbury, 33
UWLAR 117, 123 n.44 (2001) (explaining the three-phase clinical trials involve Phase I to test the drug's
safety on only healthy volunteers that include 20-100 people, Phase II to test its efficacy on 100-500 patients
suffering from the disease or condition in question, and Phase III to ensure the drug actually works through
placebo, random and double-blind tests on 1000-3000 patients). See also Alvin J. Lorman, FDA/Patent Law
Intersection: What's New with Hatch-Waxman, 666 PLLIPAT 337, 353 (2001) (describing the testing and
approval phases of the FDA regulatory review period).
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thirteen years. 12 Brand name drug manufacturers argued this delay reduced
the effective life of their patents and drastically diminished their
recuperation of production costs, making it necessary to invest more in the
research and development of new life-enhancing pharmaceutical products. 3
These amendments also made generic competition more feasible
through the creation of "paper" New Drug Approval ("NDA") applications.
Generic drugs approved before 1962 could obtain FDA approval based upon
literature on the chemical in question that demonstrated its safety so long as
the generic product was bioequivalent to the patented drug.14 However,
since the Kefauver-Harris Amendments only applied to generic drugs pre-
1962, any generic product after that date still had to complete a full NDA
before acquiring FDA approval.15 The immense cost of conducting studies
and the limited profits available to generic drug companies resulted in the
majority of companies not even attempting to complete NDA applications. 16
By 1984, only fifteen paper NDAs for post-1962 generic drug, out of 150
prescription drugs for which patents had expired, existed in the market. 7
More concerned with enhancing recuperation opportunities for
pioneer pharmaceutical companies than in making generics more accessible
to the public, in 1978 President Carter initiated a comprehensive review of
industrial innovation and patent term restoration.1 8  Three years later, the
Senate unanimously passed the Patent Term Restoration Act to achieve the
president's goals of extending the terms of patents to a seven-year
12. Commission on the Federal Drug Approval Process, Final Report Prepared by the Subcommittee on
Natural Resources, Agricultural Research and Environment and the Subcommittee on Investigation and Over-
sight of Science and Technology, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) (explaining that from the synthesis of the New
Chemical Entity ("NCE") to the approval of the new drug, the FDA approval process now took approximately
nine to thirteen years). See also FDA's Drug Review and Approval Times, Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research, 1 http://www.fda.gov/cder/reports/reviewtimes/default.htm (July 30, 2001) (explaining that new
drug approval times have been cut in half from a median of twenty-two months in 1992 to a median of less
than twelve months in 1999).
13. Will, supra note 10, at 1038. Although designed to provide greater protection to the American public
by requiring proof of both safety and efficacy, the 1962 amendments have created an unacceptably large
increase in approval time, a decrease in incentive for drug innovation, and a barrier to the acquisition of neces-
sary drugs for seriously ill patients.
14. Drug Amendments of 1962, supra note 9. Brown, supra note 11, at 125 (describing how pioneer
drugs submit an NDA, which is an application to the FDA for permission to market the drug that contains
extensive information on all the animal and human studies conducted, how and where the new drug will be
manufactured, how the drug's performance will be maintained, stability tests, and the drug maker's ability to
make, package, label, and market the drug).
15. Drug Amendments of 1962, supra note 9. See United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453,
461 (1983) (concluding that a generic version of a drug that was already approved by FDA after 1962 was still
a "new drug" under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act).
16. Brown, supra note 11, at 127.
17. H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984). See also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Striking the Right Balance
Between Innovation and Drug Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act, 54 FOOD AND
DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
18. Mossinghoff, supra note 17, at 188. See Brown, supra note 11, at 124.
[Vol. 29:1
Prescription Drug Market
limitation.' 9 It failed to become law, however, because the same bill was
placed on the House Suspension Calendar where it garnered a simple
majority of the votes.2" Consequently, after the shift to safety and efficacy
standards in FDA approval, no substantive changes were made to the drug
approval process between 1962 and 1984.
III. HATCH-WAXMAN
Aiming to add affordability to the drug approval equation, Congress
passed the Hatch-Waxman Act, which was signed into law on September 24,
1984.21 The purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act was two-fold. It was
intended to encourage the accessibility of less expensive generic drugs and
to minimize uncompensated regulatory delay for pharmaceutical companies
engaged in costly, risk-infused investments in research and development.22
Hatch-Waxman created a simplified generic drug approval process, called
abbreviated new drug applications ("ANDAs"), market exclusivity periods
for both pioneer and generic drugs, and patent term extensions. 23  The law
marked the first time the FDA had to consider the existence of patents as
part of its approval process for certain new drugs.24 In theory, these
provisions were designed to balance, simplify, and expedite the regulatory
process for both brand name and generic drug makers. In practice, however,
they have opened the door to costly lawsuits that delay bringing inexpensive
generics to the market, the abuse of market exclusivity and patent extension
loopholes, anticompetitive deal-making between generic and name brand
19. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585
(1984) (codified in sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 35 U.S.C.). Implementing regulations, 21
C.F.R. pt. 314 (1998).
20. Mossinghoff, supra note 17, at 188. The Suspension Calendar requires two-thirds majority for pas-
sage.
21. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, supra note 19. See also Congressional
Budget Office, How Increased Competition from Generic Drugs Has Affected Prices and Returns in the
Pharmaceutical Industry (July 1998) [hereinafter CBO, Increased Competition] available at http://www.cbo.
gov/showdoc.cfm?index-655&sequence=0 (describing how Hatch-Waxman helped increase the supply of
generic drugs, which resulted in more innovator drugs facing generic competition after their patents expired,
which in turn, caused pioneer drug firms to lose over forty percent of their market to generic drugs). See also
Am. Bioscience v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, Dkt. No. CV-00-08577 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000); Federal Trade
Commission Brief as amicus curiae, at 5, available at http://www.ftc.gov/osl 2000/09/amicusbrief.pdf (2000)
(stating that generic drug companies typically charge seventy to eighty percent of the brand name drug manu-
facturer's prices and as additional versions of the same drug enter the market, the price sometimes falls to a
level of fifty percent of the brand name drug price).
22. H.R. REP. No. 98-857(l), 98th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 2647-48. (The purpose was "to make available more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug
approval process for pioneer drugs first approved after 1962 ... [and] to create a new incentive for increased
expenditures for research and development of certain products which are subject to pre-market approval.").
See also Mossinghoff, supra note 17, at 187.
23. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, supra note 19.
24. Elizabeth H. Dickinson, Symposium Issue-Striking the Right Balance Between Innovation and Drug
Price Competition: Understanding the Hatch- Waxman Act, 54 FOOD AND DRUG L.J. 195 (1999).
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drug firms, and hefty revenues that are not devoted to research and
development.
A. Abbreviated New Drug Applications
To resolve the discrepancy between pre-1962 and post-1962 generic
drugs, Hatch-Waxman created the ANDAs for generic products equivalent to
pioneer drugs first approved after 1962.25 For new drugs, it maintained the
rigorous NDA process, but now required the FDA to publish any claimed
patents for the approved drug in the "Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations," which is called the "Orange Book., 26
Any generic drug company could use the original drug maker's NDA to
prove safety and efficacy in its ANDA so long as the generic was
"bioequivalent" to the patent listed in the Orange Book, and it completed one
of four ANDA certifications.2 ' The four possible certifications are set by:
Paragraph I if no patent information on the drug product that is the subject of
the ANDA has been submitted to the FDA;28 Paragraph II if the patent has
expired; 29 Paragraph III if the patent will expire on a stated date; 30 or
Paragraph IV if the patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the drug for which the ANDA applicant seeks
approval.3' Paragraphs I to III do not create a cause of action because the
FDA can easily determine whether a patent has been submitted or when a
patent expires. However, patent infringement is a legal question that cannot
be answered by the FDA.
If a Paragraph IV ANDA is filed and the patent holder files an
infringement suit within forty-five days of the required notice from the
generic applicant, Hatch-Waxman prohibits FDA approval of the ANDA
until the end of a thirty-month stay or on the date a court decides the patent
is invalid or not infringed.32 The mere filing of an infringement therefore
25. Id. Hatch-Waxman requires the FDA to approve or disapprove an ANDA within 180 days of receipt
and reject any ANDA for a minimum of five years after granting approval to the pioneer drug, or for a period
of three years if it is an over-the-counter drug. See 21 U.S.C. § 355.
26. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j). It is named after the color of the publication's orange cover. The patents claim a
product, a method of using a product, or a method of manufacturing a product.
27. Id. Bioequivalence requires an FDA finding that "the rate and extent of absorption of the [new] drug
do not show a significant difference from the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug." 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(8)(B)(i).
28. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I).
29. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(II).
30. 21 U.S.C. § 355j)(2)(A)(vii)(III).
31. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
32. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)(I)(II)(II1)(c)(3)(C) (West 1999). If a generic drug company wins in
lower court and the patentee appeals, the generic will often not want to risk liability for damages by bringing a
generic drug product to the market before the patent litigation is resolved, even if the thirty months have
passed. Dickinson, supra note 24, at 198.
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can provide additional years of a generic-free market, regardless of the
merits of the lawsuit.33 This provision of Hatch-Waxman can also encourage
generics to wait until the listed patent expires before entering the market to
avoid the automatic thirty-month stay and time consuming lawsuits.34
B. Market Exclusivity
The second prong to the Hatch-Waxman drug approval system is
market exclusivity. The Act established 180-day generic drug exclusivity
for the first ANDA applicant, five-year new chemical entity ("NCE")
exclusivity, and three-year new clinical study exclusivity.35 Congress also
created two additional exclusivity provisions: seven-year orphan drug
exclusivity36 and six-month pediatric exclusivity.37 If a pioneer drug
company can secure a combination of these exclusivity periods, it can obtain
a significant amount of additional time to exclusively market and sell their
products at higher prices and without generic competition. Generics can also
generate large profits through market exclusivity. If a generic drug company
secures the 180-day market exclusivity where its only competition is the
name brand drug, which can cost twice as much as the generic, it can obtain
considerable profits as health insurance companies adjust their coverage
plans to include its generic alternative and consumers become familiar with
the product. This provision aiding the first ANDA applicant in the
33. 21 U.S.C.A. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)(c)(3)(C) (West 1999). See also CBO, Increased Competition, supra
note 21.
34. Dickinson, supra note 24, at 198. This strategy further delays making cheaper drugs available in
cases where the patent is invalid or not infringed on, but can also leave the brand name drug company holding
the patent unprepared for generic competition because the ANDA is secret until the approval date.
35. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, supra note 19. The five-year NCE exclu-
sivity is granted to the most innovative drugs because they contain no active moiety previously approved by
FDA, and thus are completely new building blocks of the drug products. The three-year clinical investigation
exclusivity is granted for changes to the drug product, which require reports of new clinical investigations.
Some examples of the latter exclusivity include changes in dosage form, for new indications and for switches
from prescription to over the counter drug products. If there are other indications not covered by this exclusiv-
ity then generics can be approved for those indications during this three-year period. See also Dickinson, supra
note 24, at 200-01.
36. Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified in scattered sections of 21
U.S.C.). The Act grants a seven-year period of market exclusivity for new drugs that are developed for treat-
ment of rare diseases with fewer than 200,000 afflicted patients in the United States, and bars approval of the
same drug for the same disease or condition, even from a second full NDA. See Dickinson, supra note 24, at
202.
37. Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296
(1997) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). The Act grants a six-month period of market
exclusivity for new drugs that are tested for use by children at the request of the FDA. Because the purpose is
merely to inform the public, it does not require new labeling or evidence of safety and effectiveness in the
children's studies. See Dickinson, supra note 24, at 203. In December 2001, Congress passed the Best Phar-
maceuticals for Children Act, S. 1789, which reauthorized FDAMA, and on January 4, 2002, President George
W. Bush signed it into law. Pub. Law. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002).
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prescription drug market also provides an incentive to challenge. invalid
patents and develop alternative forms of patented drugs.38
C. Patent Term Extensions
The final part of the Hatch-Waxman system is the patent extension
process. The Hatch-Waxman Act permits patent term extensions or
restorations to compensate the pioneer drug makers for the lengthy
regulatory review process, provided the term has not expired and has not
already been extended.39 The extension term for a pioneer drug is equal to
one-half of the time of the investigational new drug ("IND") period, running
from the time in which a pioneer can begin human clinical trials plus the
time during the NDA review period.4" However, if the patent was issued
after the date of enactment or if the patent was issued before the date of
enactment, and no clinical testing had been conducted, the extension cannot
exceed five years.4 If the patent was issued for a drug before the date of
enactment and clinical testing had begun, it was considered a pipeline drug
that could not obtain an extension exceeding two years.42 The reason for this
distinction was "to encourage the research and development of future
products. All products which had not yet undergone testing or review by the
Food and Drug Administration were judged to be appropriately eligible for
the full five years of patent extension.,
43
The patent term was further lengthened in 1994 following the
ratification of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights44 and the passage of implementing legislation.45 The new law
38. See Granutec, Inc. v. Shalala, 139 F.3d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the FDA's regulations
were inconsistent with the statute and invalid, thereby confirming that when a generic follows all applicable
FDA regulations and is entitled to a final approval effective on that date, it will not be denied).
39. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, supra note 19. See also Mossinghoff,
supra note 17, at 2 (stating that the review period for new drugs used to delay entry into the market for years,
but today takes approximately 12-14 months).
40. Id. See also Oversight--The Food and Drug Admin. 's Process for Approving New Drugs: Hearing
before the Subcomm. on Sci., Research and Tech. of the House Comm. on Sci. and Tech., 96th Cong., I st Sess.
76 (1979) (testimony of William Wardell) (explaining that an IND must include information adequate to
demonstrate that it is safe to test the drug on human subjects and to indicate drug composition, manufacturing
and control data, results of animal testing, training and experience of the investigators, and a plan for clinical
investigation).
41. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, supra note 19.
42. Id.
43. 106 Cong. Rec. H4219 (daily ed. June 14, 1999) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman).
44. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 1C to WTO Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197
(1994) available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legale/27-trips.wpf [hereinafter WTO-TRIPs Agree-
ment].
45. Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). (codified at 35 U.S.C.
§ 154).
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gave a drug with a patent in effect or pending on June 8, 1995 a twenty-year
patent term from the patent application date or a seventeen-year patent term
from the date the patent was granted, whichever was longer.46 The
difference between these two time periods was named the "Delta Period,"
defined as a safe harbor when no generic drug company could compete in the
market.4 7  In addition, in 1996 a patent term of twenty years from its filing
date pursuant to the Uruguay Round Agreements Act 48 was permitted to
extend even further through a Hatch-Waxman patent restoration.49
Consistent with the Hatch-Waxman goal of innovation, the reasoning for this
decision was that pioneer drugs face unnecessary delays in the FDA approval
process.5"
IV. MANIPULATING THE HATCH-WAXMAN SYSTEM
Over the past eighteen years, this drug approval system has been
manipulated to delay bringing generics to the market and garner more profits
for brand name drug manufacturers. The shrewd tactics of these drug
companies, which in some cases may be illegal, have delayed the sale of
generic drugs through improper patent listing with the FDA, unmeritorious
infringement lawsuits against Paragraph IV ANDA applicants, and
anticompetitive agreements between pioneer and generic drug makers."
A. Blocking Generic Competition Through Groundless Infringement
Lawsuits and Questionable Patent Listings
Often a pharmaceutical company will submit to the FDA for listing
in the Orange Book a new method of use, new labeling or a new patent,
which is so similar to a previous patent that it covers a generic copy of the
46. Id. at 35 U.S.C. § 154(c)(1).
47. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Royce Lab., 69 F.3d 1130, 1132 (Fed. Cir. 1995). The court said a ge-
neric drug can be approved and prepare to enter the market during this period if the patented drug it copies did
not have a patent in effect or pending on June 8, 1995.
48. Merck v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Uruguay Rounds Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 103-
465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994). 35 U.S.C. § 154.
49. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1544 The restoration did not apply to the five patents that were still in force in
1996 due to the 1984 law. See also CBO, Increased Competition, supra note 21, at Chap. 3, 3. (stating that
between fifty and sixty applications for patent restoration are filed with the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office each year and of the 101 drugs containing new chemical compounds between 1992 and 1995,
fifty-one of them received extensions, which on average lasted 2.9 years. The total patent term for these drugs
was on average was 11.5 years).
50. Merck, 80 F.3d at 1544.
51. Testimony of Timothy Muffs, Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, before the Senate Com-
merce, Science and Energy Committee, April 23, 2002, available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hear-
ings/042302muris.pdf.
2002]
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first patent.5 2 The company will time its submission of a new listing to occur
immediately before a generic drug firm has planned to launch the
introduction of its product into the market, thereby triggering the thirty-
month stay on this competition by bringing an infringement lawsuit.53 This
strategy guarantees the brand name drug years of additional unfettered
market exclusivity and millions of dollars in profits.
For example, Eli Lilly ("Lilly") engaged in this conduct to protect its
popular brand name drug, Prozac 4 In December 1995, Barr Laboratories,
Inc. ("Barr") filed an ANDA to produce and sell an antidepressant consisting
of fluoxetine hydrochloride, which is an active ingredient in Prozac." In
April 1996, Lilly brought an infringement action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana against Barr.56 Because of Lilly's
claim, the FDA could not approve Barr's ANDA application for thirty
months or until the court issued a decision, even though the court later
rejected Lilly's lawsuit.57 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals found that
Lilly had two patents for essentially the same drug: one for the compound
fluoxetine hydrochloride and one for the administration of fluoxetine
hydrochloride. 8 It concluded that Lilly staggered the timing of its patents in
1974 and 1986 to extend its monopoly beyond the usual seventeen years and
requested to patent the drug for a second use to extend exclusive marketing
rights.59
Lilly generated $2.7 billion selling Prozac domestically in 2000
alone.6 ° Meanwhile, more than three years passed between the time of filing
the infringement suit and the first court decision, and five years passed
between the time of filing the infringement suit and the final appellate
decision.61 Even though the patent was invalid, the infringement lawsuit
52. Chris Adams and Gardiner Harris, Drug Makers Face Battle to Preserve Patent Extensions-
Governors Join Businesses, Labor Unions in Effort to Hasten Generics to Market, WALL ST. J., March 19,
2002, at A24. Brand name drug makers also commonly file citizen petitions raising safety questions about a
potential competitor, which are often without merit and can delay approval. Between 1990 and 2000, eighty
percent of these petitions were substantially rejected by the FDA or were withdrawn.
53. Id. See also Muris, supra note 51, at 17. The majority of patents subject to Paragraph IV certifications
that result in patent infringement litigation involve formulation and method of use. These are not the patents
on the active ingredient contained in the drug product, but the patents on how the product is formulated - for
example, into tablets - or how the product will be used to treat certain health problems.
54. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Lab., 251 F.3d 955 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
55. Id. at 958.
56. Id. Lilly subsequently sued Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Apotex, Inc., and Bernard C. Sherman, all
of whom had also filed ANDA applications with the FDA, and the actions were consolidated.
57. Id. at 968.
58. Id. at 959.
59. Id. at 968-69.
60. Rafael Gerena-Morales, Substitute Will Push Up Co-Payments for Prozac, TAMPA TRIB., July 31,
2001, at 1.
61. Eli Lilly, 251 F.3d at 958. The first decision was issued on January 10, 1999 and the appellate deci-
sion was issued on May 30, 2001.
[Vol. 29:1
Prescription Drug Market
triggered an automatic two and one-half years of no ANDA approval along
with no opportunity to bring the cheaper generic to the market.6 2 This delay
provided a significant marketing and profit advantage to the name brand
company which it fully exploited while forestalling the availability of a
cheaper, generic alternative available to the public.
Similarly, AstraZeneca, another large pioneer drug firm, filed an
infringement suit to protect its blockbuster heartburn drug, Prilosec,
commonly known as the "purple pill" in its advertising campaign.63 On June
6, 2000, Mutual Pharmaceutical Company ("Mutual") filed an ANDA
seeking FDA approval to market a generic ten milligram felodipine tablet,
and, following an amendment, a 1.5 milligi'am tablet and a five milligram
tablet.64  The ANDA contained three Paragraph IV certifications.65  On
September 18, 2000, AstraZeneca exercised its right to bring an infringement
action, arguing that Mutual's notice letters failed to include a complete and
detailed explanation on how the generic product would not infringe upon its
patent.66 While the United States District Court for Eastern Pennsylvania
acknowledged the notice was "far from exemplary," it concluded that
AstraZeneca did not show prejudice or that inadequate notice constitutes an
actionable violation under the Hatch-Waxman Act.67 Moreover, AstraZeneca
admitted that there was neither precedent nor a statute establishing a legal
remedy for an incomplete ANDA notice.68
As with Lilly, this lawsuit, regardless of merit or the lack of a
possible legal remedy, triggered the thirty-month stay on the ANDA and
enabled the name brand drug company to generate huge additional profits.
At $4 per pill, Prilosec accounted for $3.7 billion in sales in the United
States in 2001 and $26 billion in the past five years.69 Moreover, the
Prilosec patent expiration date was initially set for April 2001, yet no
62. Joseph Brown, Prozac for the Long Term, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A4. In anticipation of
losing its market power on the August 2003 patent expiration date, which had already been extended with a
pediatric six-month exclusivity period, Lilly launched Sarafem, a new brand name for fluoxetine, which is the
active chemical in Prozac in August 2000. In March 2001, it also launched Prozac Weekly, the first and only
prescription medication administered weekly for the treatment of depression. Prozac Weekly has patent pro-
tection until 2017 and therefore, can serve as the successor drug to dominate the drug market. Id.
63. AstraZeneca AB v. Mutual Pharm. Co., Inc., No. CIV.A.00-4731, 2002 W.L. 393119 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
12, 2002).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 5.
68. Id.
69. Ronald D. White, Key Drug Patent Ruling Nears; Courts: Effort to Block Generic Versions of Pril-
osec Could Set Trend in the Industry, L.A. TIMES, May 28, 2002, at B1; Gardiner Harris, Drug Prices - Why
They Keep Soaring - Fast Relief- As a Patent Expires, Drug Firm Lines Up Pricey Alternative - Prilosec's
Maker Is Switching Users to a Lookalike Pill While It Thwarts Generics - Mr. Young Scrapes to Afford It,
WALL ST. J., June 6, 2002, at Al.
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generics have been launched due to seven years of planning by marketers,
lawyers and scientists at AstraZeneca.7 ° The ANDA infringement lawsuit
was just one of many approaches to delaying generic entry into the market.7'
The combined effort ensured that AstraZeneca was generously compensated
while it impeded the Hatch-Waxman goal of making generic drugs available
to consumers.72
A third example of aggressive strategies to avoid generic competition
through questionable patent listings and infringement lawsuits is Bristol-
Myers Squibb's ("BMS") actions in protecting its monopoly over the sale of
BuSpar for the treatment of anxiety. 73  In 1980, BMS obtained a patent
covering the use of buspirone, which it has sold as BuSpar since 1986. 74 On
November 21, 2000, less than one day before the patent expired, BMS listed
a newly-obtained patent in the Orange Book covering what buspirone
becomes when swallowed and indicated that a reasonable claim of patent
infringement could be asserted against generic producers of the drug. 75 On
the same day, it filed a Paragraph IV ANDA infringement lawsuit to trigger
the thirty-month stay.7
6
In response to this last minute patent filing, generic drug makers
seeking to enter the buspirone market, direct purchasers of buspirone
products, end-payors who have purchased buspirone, consumer protection
organizations, and thirty states all filed an antitrust action against BMS.77
Among the plaintiffs' claims were that BMS tried to extend its monopoly by
inappropriately listing a subsequent patent in the Orange Book so it could
file an infringement lawsuit and obtain thirty additional months of market
exclusivity. 78 The Southern New York District Court concluded that there
was no basis for BMS to claim that its second patent covered the use of
buspirone or that it could have been valid if it did.79 "Bristol-Myers's
creative legal arguments to the contrary cannot breathe life into claims that
70. Harris, supra note 69, at Al (explaining that AstraZeneca obtained an additional six-month pediatric
exclusivity).
71. Id. In March 2001, AstraZeneca established a successor heartburn drug, called Nexium. It spent $478
million on an advertising and promotional campaign in 2001 to switch Prilosec users to Nexium, "today's
purple pill, from the makers of Prilosec," according to their advertisements. By April 2002, Prilosec's share of
heartburn prescriptions dropped to twenty-five percent from forty-nine percent in 2000 and Nexium had al-
ready acquired nineteen percent. Nexium is half of the Prilosec molecule so it is essentially the same drug in a
smaller dosage.
72. White, supra note 69, at B1.
73. In re Buspirone Patent Litig./In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 185 F.Supp.2d 363, 365 (S.D.N.Y.
2002).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 366.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 366.
78. Id. at 378.
79. Buspirone, 185 F.Supp.2d at 376.
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have no basis."8 ° There was neither scientific innovation nor legal grounds
for filing the second patent; just innovative legal maneuvering.
The court summarized how and why a company might abuse the
Hatch-Waxman system:
Bristol-Myers could have listed the '365 Patent [the second patent]
in the Orange Book without subsequently bringing infringement
suits against Mylan and Watson, and Bristol-Myers could have
brought these suits without relying on its Orange Book listing.
What listing does is simply provide the owner of a patent with a
number of additional and automatic benefits under the Hatch-
Waxman Amendments. For example, by listing a patent that
allegedly covers a listed drug or a method of using a listed drug, a
pioneer drug company obtains (i) the right to receive notice of any
ANDA from applicants seeking FDA approval of a generic form of
the drug who have filed a Paragraph IV certification with regard to
the patent in question; (ii) a grace period of forty-five days in
which to bring a patent infringement suit against any such
applicant before the applicant can file a declaratory judgment
action; and (iii) if the pioneer drug company brings such a lawsuit,
a stay of up to thirty months of the FDA's approval of the
ANDA.8l
The court's assessment of the ways in which BMS's decision to list
in the Orange Book, despite the groundless nature of its infringement suit,
illustrates how the brand name drug companies can abuse the Hatch-
Waxman system to their advantage and to the disadvantage of consumers.82
The Federal Circuit did reverse this opinion, but only because the statute did
not provide a private right of action to compel de-listing of a patent from the
Orange Book.83
Since 1986, when BMS began selling BuSpar, the blockbuster drug
has generated $700 million in annual sales.84 During the four months it took
for the court to rule in favor of the generic companies, BMS made
80. Id.
81. Id. at 372. Mylan and Watson also sought to produce generic drugs.
82. Susan R. Miller, Protecting Patents: Some Giant Brand-Name Drug Makers Using Delay Tactics to
Keep Generic Competitors at Bay, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., May 20, 2002, at A10. BMS used similar ag-
gressive tactics to hold up the release of Ivax Corporation's generic version of its cancer drug, Taxol, and to
obtain an additional three and one-half years of market exclusivity for its diabetes drug Glucophage by trying
unsuccessfully to convince Congress to carve out a special exception to the law in the reauthorization of the
pediatric exclusivity law. See also Harris, supra note 69, at Al (stating that in June 2002, twenty-nine state
attorney generals sued BMS for using frivolous patents to delay generic competition to Taxol).
83. Muris, supra note 51, at 10.
84. Id.
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approximately $200 million. 5 As with Lilly and AstraZeneca, BMS brought
a valuable drug to the market and instead of playing by the Hatch-Waxman
rules, submitted a last minute patent to stave off generic competition, ensure
market domination, and generate more company profits.8 6
At least twelve pioneer drug companies are actively taking advantage
of the ability to trigger a thirty-month stay of generic competition. 7 In most
cases, the newly filed patent is no different from the initial patent.
AstraZeneca's Nexium, for example, is merely a half molecule of Prilosec,
which in the company's own studies had virtually identical healing rates.8
In one study, Nexium achieved a ninety percent healing rate as compared to
eighty-seven percent by Prilosec for the same dosage.8 9 Refusing to release
detailed descriptions of two other negative studies on Nexium, AstraZeneca
filed its patent and cited the one positive study to doctors and consumers as
grounds for why Nexium was a newer, better drug.90
This practice of selling something as new that lacks genuine
innovation and improvement over previous drugs is replicated throughout the
industry. Two-thirds of new drugs approved from 1989 to 2000 used active
ingredients already on the market.9' Over this twelve-year period, only
fifteen percent (153) of all new drug approvals were medicines that used new
active ingredients and provided significant clinical improvement over
currently marketed products.92 In addition, over the past six years, eighty
percent of the drugs approved by the FDA were deemed "standard drugs,"
and therefore, similar to what already exists.93
Every pioneer drug company has the legal right to bring an
infringement claim and protect its intellectual property. However, these
suits must be based on the legitimate threat of infringing a valid patent, and
not on a mere reformulation of a pill or dosage strength that is designed to
85. Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profit and the Public Health, ABC News, available at http://www.abcnews.
go.com/onair/ABCNEWSSpecials/pharmaceuticals_020529_pjrfeature.html (May 29, 2002).
86. But see id. (citing the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA), which
represents the nation's research-based pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies, stating that between
1984 and January 1, 2001, only 478 of the 8,259 generic drug applications filed with the FDA involved patent
disputes).
87. Miller, supra note 82.
88. Harris, supra note 69, at Al.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Nat'l Inst. for Health Care Mgmt., Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical Innovation, 7-8,
http://www.nihcm.org.innovations.pdf (May 28, 2002).
92. Id. But see Alan F. Holmer, Innovation is Key Mission, USA TODAY, May 31, 2002, at 1 IA (arguing
that the pharmaceutical industry spends more than $30 billion annually on research and development, with
eighty percent of this investment dedicated to the advancement of scientific knowledge and the development
of products, compared to twenty percent that is devoted to improving and/or modifying existing drugs.).
93. Bitter Medicine: Pills, Profit and the Public Health, ABC NEWS, available at http://abcnews.go.com/
onair/ABCNEWSSpecials/pharmaceuticals_020529_pjrfeature.html (May 29, 2002).
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trigger the automatic thirty-month stay on generic competition. The purpose
of Hatch-Waxman was to stimulate innovation and improvement of new
prescription medications, not to just sell the old drugs in new dosages with
new labels and advertising schemes. Automatically rewarding a pioneer
drug company with this thirty-month period of additional market exclusivity
simply for filing an infringement suit that is unmediated by merit makes this
improper conduct all too easy. Moreover, the lack of patent law expertise of
the FDA, which presumes all submissions for listing are valid, facilitates the
regular exploitation of the Hatch-Waxman system.94 When pioneer drug
makers are allowed to essentially duplicate their drugs to stretch out their
market exclusivity, their conduct is an abuse of Hatch-Waxman and an
obstruction of its twin goals. This practice perpetuates the tendency of
pioneer drug makers placing profits over innovation and keeps low cost
generic drugs off the market and inaccessible to consumers.
B. Using Patent Extensions to Maintain Market Control and High Profits
The patent term extension provisions in Hatch-Waxman and in the
aforementioned orphan drug and pediatric exclusivity laws increase the
already hefty pioneer drug profits secured through even longer market
exclusivity periods and ANDA infringement suits. At the time Hatch-
Waxman formed the pipeline drug provisions creating the patent extensions
for pending FDA applications, Congress assumed that these drugs were close
to completion and would be approved within one or two years. 95 However,
many of these drugs were not close to completion and did not obtain FDA
approval for another eight years, and therefore applied for and received other
extensions. 96 Some of the extended time in the market free from generic
competition includes not just the thirty-month stay for the ANDA, but
another six months through the pediatric exclusivity provision. As of
February 15, 2002, thirty-one different prescription drugs had received the
pediatric exclusivity periods, including popular products by Bristol-Myers
Squibb, AstraZeneca and Schering-Plough.97
94. See Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2477, at *7-*8 (D.
Md. Jan. 17, 2001) (stating "It [FDA] has no expertise-much less any statutory franchise--to determine
matters of substantive patent law. In making its decision to list a patent, therefore, it is entirely appropriate
and reasonable for the FDA to rely on the patentee's declaration as to the coverage . .
95. Mossinghoff, supra note 17, at 3.
96. Id.
97. The complete list of products receiving this exclusivity is available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ pedi-
atric/labelchange.htm.
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In addition, the Uruguay Round Agreements Act98 led to the delay of
generic versions of more than 100 prescription drugs-including Glaxo
Wellcome's Zantac for ulcers, Merck's Mevacor for cholesterol, and Bristol-
Meyer Squibb's Capoten for heart conditions-for up to two additional
years.99 These patent extensions can lead to overwhelming profits for
pioneer drug firms. For instance, the extension for the G.D. Searle & Co.
patent on the arthritis drug Daypro resulted in approximately $280 million in
sales in 1996, and the Schering-Plough patent for allergy medication Claritin
generated annual sales of approximately $2.2 billion.'00
In sum, brand name drug manufacturers have succeeded in stretching
out the patent terms for their high profit, blockbuster drugs in addition to
finding ways to list new patents in the Orange Book, triggering a thirty-
month stay on generic competition and lengthening their market exclusivity
periods. These astute efforts to game the Hatch-Waxman system contradict
the Act's goals of balancing innovation with affordability. Some critics,
including the FTC, no longer classify some of these actions as merely
aggressive legal maneuvers, but rather, illegal violation of antitrust laws.''
C. Creating Anticompetitive Agreements to Protect Monopoly Power in the
Prescription Drug Market
In response to recent settlements between brand name and generic
drug companies disputing infringement claims, the FTC has begun to
challenge the legality of paying generic firms millions of dollars to keep
their products out of the market during their 180-day exclusivity periods.' 2
Because generic entry into the market lowers prices so dramatically, generic
companies gain substantially less in profits than what the brand name
companies lose in profits. 0 3 As a result, both parties can benefit from
colluding to delay generic entry. 0 4  The FTC has become engaged in "first
generation litigation" to block anticompetitive agreements' 0 5 and "second
generation litigation" to stop improper listings of patents and exclusive
98. 35 U.S.C. § 154.
99. Celia Wexler, Prescription for Power: How Brand-Name Drug Companies Prevailed Over Consum-
ers in Washington, A Report from the Common Cause Education Fund, Common Cause, 11, available at
http://commoncause.org/publications/june01/phrma/061201 
.pdf (June 2001).
100. Id. See also Families USA, The Drug Industry Facts and Figures, http://www.familiesusa.org/
factsheet.pdf (April 2002) (describing sales revenues for leading drugs in 2000).
101. See id. (stating that in just one four-month period, November 2000 to March 2001, these companies
accumulated at least $160 million in additional sales by illegally manipulating the Hatch-Waxman system).
102. See Muris, supra note 51.
103. Id. at 6.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 3.
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distributorship and market division agreements that illegally control the
market. 106
The two leading collusion cases in which the FTC has intervened
successfully, resulting in consent orders, are Abbott/Geneva and
Hoechst/Andrx. °7 In the first case, the FTC alleged that Abbott paid Geneva
approximately $4.5 million per month to delay bringing its generic version
of the hypertension drug, Hytrin, to the market.'0 8 It also claimed that
Geneva agreed to not transfer its 180-day market exclusivity rights and to
not introduce any generic Hytrin product (even if it did not infringe the
patent) until the patent infringement litigation was finally resolved or
another generic Hytrin manufacturer entered the market.'0 9 "In the second
case, the FTC alleged that Hoechst Marion Roussel ("Hoeshst") paid Andrx
$10 million per quarter, beginning in July 1998, when Andrx gained FDA
approval for its generic version of Cardizem CD, a widely prescribed drug
for treatment of hypertension and angina. The FTC also alleged that
Hoechst had agreed to pay Andrx an additional $60 million per year from
July 1998 to the conclusion of the lawsuit if Andrx won. This
anticompetitive agreement kept Andrx from entering the market with its
generic drug and from transferring its 180-day exclusivity period to another
generic company."0 The consent orders for both of these cases prohibited
the respondents from entering into brand name/generic agreements where the
first ANDA filer agrees to not enter the market with a non-infringing product
or transfer its 180-day market exclusivity rights."' They also required
advance notice to the FTC as well as court approval for any interim
settlement agreements during patent infringement litigation that provided
payments to generics to stay out of the market." 
2
106. Id.
107. Complaint, Abbott Labs. and Geneva Pharm., FTC Dkt. No. C-3945 (May 22, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945complaint.htm; Complaint, Geneva Pharm., FTC Dkt. No. C-3946 (May
22, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946complaint.htm; Complaint, Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital L.P. and Andrx Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9293 (Mar. 16, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoeschtandrxcomplaint.htm.
108. Complaint, Abbott Labs., at 27.
109. Id. at 26.
110. Complaint, Hoechst, at 23; See also Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, Consent Agreement
Resolves Complaint Against Pharmaceutical Companies Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. and Andrx Corp.
(April 2, 2001) available at http://www. ftc.gov/opa/2001/04/hoechst.htm
111. Id.
112. Consent Order, Abbott Labs. and Geneva Pharm., FTC Dkt. No. C-3945 (May 22, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945.do.htm; Consent Order, Geneva Pharm., FTC Dkt. No. C-3946 (May
22, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/genevad&O.htm; Consent Order, Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc., Carderm Capital L.P. and Andrx Corp., FTC Dkt. No. 9293 (Mar. 16, 2000).
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/9912/hoechstagree.htm See also Complaint, Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297
(Mar. 30, 2001), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2001/04/scheringpart3cmp.pdf (addressing similar issues
in a pending case).
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A principal focus of the FTC's "second generation" litigation is
improper Orange Book listings. 113 The FTC first raised concerns about the
possible anticompetitive effect of improperly listing" 4 in American
Bioscience v. Bristol-Myers Squibb."5 It filed an amicus brief to request that
the United States District Court for the Central District of California not
issue an order requiring Bristol-Myers Squibb ("BMS") as the patent holder
for the cancer drug, Taxol, to list American Bioscience's new patent in the
Orange Book. The FTC wanted to avoid an improper listing and argued that
a court-ordered listing would assign validity to the new patent that had not
yet been proven.1 6 While the court did order the listing, it was later vacated
and BMS withdrew the original submission, suggesting it knew the patent
was invalid. 1 7  During appellate motions, the court found American
Bioscience was not substantially likely to succeed on the merits. 1 8 The court
battle did not end there. Ivax Corporation, the affiliate for the generic
competitor filing the ANDA, Baker Norton, then charged BMS and
American Bioscience of colluding to keep the generic drug off the market."
9
This latter suit is still pending. The FTC's actions were aimed at preventing
the court from assigning legitimacy to an improper listing.
In another "second generation" lawsuit, the FTC announced a
proposed consent order with Biovail Corporation to settle charges that it
illegally acquired an exclusive patent license and wrongfully listed that
patent in the Orange Book to block generic competition to its brand name
drug, Tiazac.120 This is the first enforcement action by the FTC to remedy
the effects of an allegedly anticompetitive Orange Book listing.' 2' Before
the complaint was issued, Andrx filed an ANDA, was sued by Biovail for
infringement, and then prevailed in court. 2 2 However, Biovail acquired a
newly issued patent from a third party and listed it in the Orange Book as
claiming Tiazac, forcing Andrx to amend its ANDA certification and
triggering another thirty-month stay on generic competition. 123 The FTC
accused Biovail of knowing that its new patent did not cover the form of
113. Muris, supra note 51, at 9.
114. Id. at 9 n.36.
115. Am. Bioscience v. Bristol-Myers Squibb, et al., Dkt. No. CV-00-08577, 2000 WL 1278348 *1, (C.D.
Cal. Sept. 7, 2000).
116. Id. See Sara Beliveau, FDA: Approval of Generic Drug Reversed by U.S. Court of Appeals, 30 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS, 120, 120 (Mar. 22, 2002).
117. Am. Bioscience, 2000 WL 1278348 at *1.
118. Id. at 1083.
119. Beliveau, supra note 116, at 121.
120. The FTC complaint against Biovail is available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/biovailcom-
plaint.htm.
121. Muris, supra note 51, at 12.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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Tiazac it had been marketing, and Biovail later admitted that the newly listed
patent covered a new formulation of Tiazac that Biovail developed only after
it obtained and listed the patent so it did not cover the FDA-approved
version of Tiazac.' 24 The FDA told Biovail that the new patent lacked FDA
approval and it would be de-listed unless Biovail certified that the patent
claimed the approved ANDA version of the drug, which the company has
still failed to do.' 25 The FTC proposed a consent order that would require
Biovail to divest the illegally acquired patent to its original owner, except as
to new product developments outside the Tiazac market; to dismiss its
infringement suit against Andrx; to end the generic thirty-month stay; to
refrain from any action that would trigger any further thirty-month stays; to
prohibit Biovail from unlawfully listing patents in the Orange Book, and to
require it to give FTC notice of future listings. 126 Again, the FTC is
attempting to ensure the proper use of the Orange Book and related Hatch-
Waxman provisions.
In addition to drafting these consent orders for pending litigation, the
FTC is scrutinizing other versions of anticompetitive agreements.
Specifically, it is monitoring exclusive distributorship arrangements where a
second generic drug company agrees to become the exclusive distributor of
the first generic company's drug instead of bringing a competing generic to
the market, which gives the second generic an agreed-upon share of the
market. 127 Another anticompetitive agreement of concern for the FTC
involves dividing the market segments. 28 For instance, one company might
market its product exclusively in one strength while another company agrees
to market its product exclusively in another, thus making competition
noticeably less vigorous.'
29
The FTC's attempts to crack down on collusive, anticompetitive
activity have sparked the attention of the drug industry, Congress, and the
media. This summer, the FTC is expected to announce findings from a
comprehensive study of business relationships between brand name and
generic drug manufacturers to better understand anticompetitive
impediments to bringing low cost generics to the market and into hands of
consumers. 30 These findings may provide additional insight as to the nature
and extent of Hatch-Waxman abuses.
124. Id. at 13.
125. Id. at 13 n.54.
126. Id.
127. Muris, supra note 51, at 14.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 15.
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The combination of redundant submissions of patents to the FDA,
filing of lawsuits to block generic entry, continual extensions of drug
patents, and the negotiation of questionable anticompetitive agreements
between brand name and generic firms have upset the Hatch-Waxman
equilibrium. Hatch-Waxman, as currently applied, favors the brand name
drug companies and hinders the ability of generic competitors to provide the
public with less expensive pharmaceutical products. The simultaneous
advertising campaigns make the pioneer drug makers all the more powerful.
V. EXACERBATING THE IMBALANCE: DIRECT TO CONSUMER ADVERTISING
Beyond the legal maneuvering, pioneer drug firms have also
launched persuasive DTC advertising campaigns to enhance their
blockbuster drug profits. Today's vast marketing of name brand drugs is.
unprecedented and the techniques employed to convince consumers and
doctors that only the latest brand name drug can truly alleviate heartburn,
high blood pressure or even a headache are deceptive and misleading. As
explained previously, most "new drugs" today are the same drugs of
yesterday, and some have generics in the market. Due to the recent relaxing
of FDA rules on advertising, brand name drugs have been able to dominate
the market not only with market exclusivity and patent extensions, but with
DTC advertising as well.
The FDA requires manufacturers, packers, and distributors
(sponsors) who advertise prescription drugs to disclose in advertisements
"information in brief summary relating to side effects, contraindications, and
effectiveness.' ' 3 1 For forty years, the FDA has forbidden false or misleading
prescription drug advertisements and the omission of material facts. 132 The
advertisements are defined in one of three categories. 133 First, "product
claim" advertisements make claims about a product and must provide a fair
balance of risks and benefits as well as convenient access to this
information. 34 Second, "help-seeking" advertisements discuss a disease or
condition, advise the public to "see your doctor" and are not FDA-regulated
because they are not advertising a drug.' 35 Third, "reminder" advertisements
131. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (now codified at 21
U.S.C. § 352(n)).
132. Testimony of Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA Center for Evaluation and Research, before the
House Commerce Subcommittee on Health, June 13, 2001, ("Woodcock") at 4, available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/06132001 Hearing276/Woodcock4l2.htm.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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are targeted at health professionals and cannot make claims or recommend
dosages because they are exempted from the risk disclosure requirement. 1
36
From 1983 to 1985, the FDA requested the suspension of DTC
advertising due to concerns raised about promotions directed toward non-
health care professionals. 137 It lifted the moratorium, concluding that the
required inclusion of information on drug effectiveness and potential risks in
advertisements sufficiently protected consumers. 38  By the early 1990s,
name brand print advertising began to accelerate. These ads included brief
summaries regarding the adverse effects of a drug that were hard for
consumers to understand. 139 By the mid-1990s, the television advertising
began with "reminder" ads targeting health care professionals. 140  But like
the print ads, they also confused consumers since they only mentioned the
name of the drug without further explanation. '41
Responding to this problem, in August 1997, the FDA announced
guidelines to clarify how sponsors can offer convenient access to the
advertised product's approved labeling in accordance with the existing
law. 142 In August 1999, the FDA issued the Guidance for Industry:
Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, which confirmed the 1997
announcement. 143  The regulations required broadcast advertisements to
include a toll-free telephone number, referral to a print advertisement in a
concurrently running publication, access to product brochures in convenient
outlets, or referral to a healthcare provider or Internet web page.' 44 Brand
name drug companies could now produce "product claim" advertisements for
blockbuster drugs without having to list the benefits and risks in the
advertisement.
Consequently, since the 1997 regulatory change, spending on mass
media advertising for prescription drugs more than doubled from $1.1 billion
to $2.5 billion in 2000. 14  The drugs most heavily prescribed by doctors
136. Id. at 5.
137. Id.
138. Woodcock at 5. The FDA withdrew the moratorium on September 9, 1985, stating that the "current
government regulations governing prescription drug advertising provide sufficient safeguards to protect
consumers." (citing 50 Fed. Reg. 36,677).
139. Id.
140. See Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 6. (By referring to a toll-free number, a website address, a concurrently running print advertise-
ment or health care professionals in the broadcast advertisement, the ad would meet the legal standard of
convenient access to the product's approved labeling.).
143. Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (1999), 64
Fed. Reg. 43,197.
144. Id. (These measures satisfy the "adequate provisions" requirement.).
145. Nat'l Inst. for Health Care Mgmt., Prescription Drugs and Mass Media Advertising, 2000, at
http://www.nihcm.org/DTCbrief2001.pdf (Nov. 2001). Advertising is just one part of the pharmaceutical
industry's drug promotion campaigns, on which they spent $15.7 billion in 2000. Id. at 5.
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between 1997 and 1999 were those most heavily advertised. 146  In fact,
eighty percent of the FDA-approved drugs that were marketed the most to
consumers over the past several years were in the top twenty percent of
drugs physicians prescribed. 147 Doctors are also prescribing more drugs for
their patients than in the past. For instance, in 1999 they prescribed 146
drugs for every 100 office visits compared to 109 drugs per 100 office visits
in 1985.148 Moreover, when asked by patients, many physicians prescribe a
name brand drug. 1
49
Members of Congress have reported similar findings and drawn
striking conclusions about the small number of blockbuster drugs leading
these advertising campaigns. The Ranking Member on the House Energy
and Commerce Subcommittee on Health stated, "[i]n 2000, the drug industry
advertised one percent of its 10,000 available prescription drugs. Ninety-five
percent of all direct to consumer advertising was spent on just fifty of these
10,000 drugs.... [T]hose fifty drugs... were responsible for half of the $21
billion increase in prescription drug spending."' 50 The Ranking Member on
the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Health added,
[D]TC advertising expenditure will reach seven billion dollars
annually. This increased spending correlates with increased prices of
prescription drugs. Like any other commodity, greater product
recognition leads to increased demand, and higher prices.... [L]arge-
scale advertising may also lead consumers to demand drugs that may
not be medically necessary or appropriate for the patient's condition.
According to the National Institute for Health Care Management,
eighty-six percent of patients who request a prescription for Claritin
from their doctor receive one.... [M]ost of the money spent on DTC
drug advertisements goes to heartburn, allergy medications, and vanity
drugs like those that prevent hair loss. These advertisements promote
consumers to seek expensive treatment for conditions that they might
not have felt the need for treatment in the past.' 
5
146. Id. at 6.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 4.
149. See Recent Developments Which May Impact Consumer Access to, and Demand for, Pharmaceuticals
before the House Commerce Subcommittee on Health, 107th Congress (June 13, 2001), available at
http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/06132001Hearing276/Woodcock4l2.htm. See also testimony
of Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA Center for Evaluation and Research (Testifying that a 1999 FDA
telephone interview found that eighty-six percent of consumers surveyed said drugs advertisements helped
make them aware of new drugs, eighty-one percent of those who spoke to their doctors about a prescription
drug said their doctor welcomed the question, seventy-nine percent of this latter group said the doctor dis-
cussed the drug with them and fifty percent of these patients said their doctor gave them the medication dis-
cussed.).
150. 107 CONG. REC. H659-01 (daily ed. March 5,2002) (statement ofRep. Sherrod Brown).
151. 147 CoNG. REc. E1225-04 (daily ed. June 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Fortney Pete Stark).
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Without a doubt, today's DTC advertising for blockbuster drugs is
unprecedented. The degree to which these ads are shaping consumer
demand and doctor supplied name brand drugs is still being determined.'52
Consumers are so familiar with television commercials for the fifty leading
brand name drugs promising to alleviate common ailments, such as arthritis
and allergies that they can ask their doctors for prescriptions by name.
Moreover, with new patents obtained and marketed as the successor drugs to
the popular initial branded drug, as with Clarinex replacing Claritin and
Nexium replacing Prilosec, the public is exposed to new advertisements
suggesting newer and better drugs. 53  With little knowledge as to the
meaning of bioequivalence, much of the public is swayed by the
advertisements. 114 Doctors are given access to only published studies on new
drugs, treated to endless free samples of blockbuster drugs, and want to meet
the demands of their patients. 155 Therefore, doctors often start out with a
name brand prescription for their patients, getting patients accustomed to the
name brand drug early in the marketing process. Just as submitting last
minute, so-called "new" patents to the FDA that offer no improvement over
past medications, advertising so-called "new" brand name drugs as better
than old ones is often a deceptive manipulation of a process gone awry.
VI. TIME FOR CHANGE
Prescription drugs have become a central part of the practice of
medicine. National expenditures on drugs continues to grow at an
astronomical pace, raising concerns about the pharmaceutical industry's
manipulation of the drug approval process as well as its disproportionate
spending on marketing and lobbying as opposed to research and
development. Eighteen years after the enactment of Hatch-Waxman, which
now operates in a changed health care environment of increased prescription
drug usage, reform is needed.
152. Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Preliminary Patient Survey Results, Food and
Drug Administration, available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/ddmac/Presentations/KitDIA2002out2/
KitDIA2002out2.PPT (June 18, 2002) (noting 2002 FDA phone survey of 943 people who had visited their
doctor in the past three months found eighty-one percent said they recalled seeing or hearing a drug advertise-
ment in past three months, and ninety-seven percent reported that this ad was on television). See also supra
note 149
153. Melody Peterson, 2 Big-Selling Arthritis Drugs Are Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, June 4,2002, at C12.
154. Id. (The article states that Celebrex and Vioxx, two heavily advertised medicines for arthritis, are over
prescribed because they have not been shown to fight pain better than older drugs like ibuprofen and naproxen,
which are available in generic and over-the-counter versions for a fraction of the price. It also states that the
heavy promotion of these drugs on television and to doctors as well as the misperception that the new drugs
are always better may cause the excessive prescribing.).
155. Harris, supra note 69, at Al.
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A. Escalating Drug Expenditures
Today, more Americans are using prescription drugs. Between 1992
and 1998, the number of prescription drugs sold increased thirty-seven
percent 156 and the three billion prescriptions sold in 2000 are expected to rise
to four billion by 2004.157  Americans use an average of ten drug
prescriptions per year while Medicare beneficiaries use eighteen.'58 The
regular use of prescription drugs has led to spiraling health expenditures.
Drug prices rose 306 percent between 1981 and 1999.59 More recently,
prescription drug spending, largely on name brand drugs,' 60 has risen fifteen
percent or more per year over the past several years. 61  The rising cost is
shouldered by health care insurers and providers and increasingly by seniors
and uninsured individuals. Most employer-sponsored health care plans
cover prescription drugs; however, if no generic drug exists for a
prescription, some patients may still pay a large portion of the drug out-of-
pocket once reaching their annual deductibles. Medicare does not provide
any outpatient prescription drug coverage. For those who are not Medicaid
eligible,' 62 or cannot obtain health insurance through their employer, paying
out-of-pocket for ten to eighteen prescriptions per person per year can be
costly. 163 Therefore, high brand name drug prices and the inability to access
cheaper drug equivalents impacts consumers and drives the public demand
for controlling the cost of what has become a vital part of modern medicine.
156. Celia Wexler, How Brand-Name Drug Companies Prevailed Over Consumers in Washington, A
Report from the Common Cause Education Fund, Common Cause, at 16, available at http://rxpolicy.com/
studies/ccausephrma0601 .pdf (June 2001).
157. Dana A. Elfin, Pharmaceuticals: Drug Cost Debate Continues, But Drug Industry Eschews Price
Controls, Bureau of National Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 19, 749 (May 8, 2000) [hereinafter Elfin, Pharmaceuticals].
158. The Profit in Pills: A Primer on Prescription Drug Prices, Alliance for Retired Americans, 13
http://www.retiredamericans.org/newstheprofitinpills.htm (May 2001) [hereinafter Profit in Pills]. Medicare
beneficiaries are sixty-five and older or are disabled. See generally Senate Finance Subcommittee on Health
Hearing on Reimbursement and Access to Prescription Drugs Under Medicare Part B, Mar. 14, 2002, avail-
able at http://finance.senate.gov/sitepages/hearing031402.htm (discusses Medicare and prescription drug
coverage).
159. Elfin, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 157, at 749.
160. See Nat'l Inst. for Health Care Mgmt., Prescription Drug Expenditures in 2001 6-7 (May 2002),
available at http://www.nihcm.org (The average price for a prescription rose ten percent from $45.27 in 2000
to $49.84 in 2001, but the average price for the fifty best-selling drugs in 2001 was $71.56. Only five generic
drugs were in this group. The fifty top selling drugs also accounted for 44.4 percent of total outpatient retail
drug sales in 2001 and sales of these drugs grew 21.4 percent in the same year.).
161. Katharine Levit et al., Inflation Spurs Health Spending in 2002, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Vol. 21, No. 1,
172-81 (Jan./Feb. 2002). See also Nat'l Inst. for Health Care Mgmt., Changing Patterns of Pharmaceutical
Innovation 3 (May 28, 2002), available at http://www.nihcm.org (explaining that drug spending rose from
$64.7 billion in 1995 to $132 billion in 2000); Nat'l Inst. for Health Care Mgmt., Prescription Drug Expendi-
tures in 2001: Another Year of Escalating Costs 363 (March 29, 2002), available at http://www.nihcm.org
(listing factors contributing to the recent growth in drug expenditures).
162. Medicaid eligibility is based on income level as a percentage of poverty and varies from state to state.
163. See generally Profit in Pills, supra note 158.
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B. Pharmaceutical Revenues and Expenditures
Despite the Hatch-Waxman goal of spurring innovation, brand name
pharmaceutical companies currently spend more on marketing than on
research and development. Although developing a drug takes eleven to
twelve years and costs about $200 million per successful product, 64 the most
popular blockbuster drugs garner tremendous profits for brand name
companies. 165  However, these companies dedicate just twelve percent of
their revenues to research and development, compared to thirty percent to
marketing and administration. 166 Moreover, the twelve drug companies with
the highest revenues spent three times as much on marketing as on research
and development in 2000.167 In addition, over the past five election cycles,
PhRMA and its members spent approximately $360 million on political
contributions, lobbying, and advertising campaigns. 1
68
While marketing is key to selling products, the disproportionate
spending on this activity in conjunction with efforts to list improper patents,
file unmeritorious patent infringement suits to trigger the thirty-month stay
on generic competition, and establish agreements to pay generic companies
not to compete raises important questions about the current drug approval
process. Pioneer drug firms are not investing in innovation close to the
extent promoted by Hatch-Waxman. Instead, they spend millions of dollars
on advertising and promotional campaigns of successor drugs to ensure high
profits and choke off access to cheaper generics. Consumers frustrated with
the inaccessibility of low cost drugs are among the toughest, most vocal
critics of pioneer drug firms today. In recent years, consumers have created
advocacy groups to lobby for better access to prescription drugs, scrutinize
the pharmaceutical industry, and to file lawsuits against the drug industry. 69
Congress, the FTC, and both previous and current White House
164. CBO, Increased Competition, supra note 21, at Chap. 3, 3.
165. The Profit in Pills: A Primer on Prescription Drug Prices, Alliance for Retired Americans (May
2001), available at http://www.retiredamericans.org/news-theprofitinpills.htm (providing that in 2000, phar-
maceutical companies had after-tax median profits of 18.6 percent, compared with five percent for all other
Fortune 500 companies combined).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Some of the leading advocacy groups pushing for legislation to lower the cost of drugs and leading the
class action lawsuits against pioneer drug companies for thwarting competition from generics include: Pre-
scription Action Litigation ("PAL") Project, which was created April 2001, available at
http://www.prescriptionaccesslitigation.org; Stop Patient Abuse Now, which was created in February 2000,
available at http://www.spancoalition.org/; Alliance for Retired Americans, which was created in January
2001; and the AARP, which on May 29, 2002 joined three lawsuits initiated by PAL against Bristol-Myers
Squibb, Schering-Plough and AstraZeneca. See generally Denise Gellene, Pharmaceuticals Targeted for
Class-Action Suits, L.A. TIMES, June 10, 2001, at Al; Robert Pear, AARP Joins Three Lawsuits Against Large
Drug Companies, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2002, at A17.
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administrations have all joined in this critique, suggesting the opportunity
for meaningful reform of the Hatch-Waxman imbalance may exist.' 70
VII. CONGRESSIONAL REFORM OF HATCH-WAXMAN
In order to restore balance to the drug approval process, the Hatch-
Waxman reforms must include setting higher standards for patent
infringement suits, eliminating the automatic thirty-month stay on generic
competition, discouraging excessive DTC advertising, providing more
information to patients and doctors on new brand name drugs, and ending the
aggressive marketing tactics that induce doctors to provide name brand drugs
instead of cheaper generic drugs. Two legislative proposals would
implement some of these recommendations.
The Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act would block
brand name drug manufacturers from withholding cheaper, generic
equivalents from consumers. 171  It would allow a generic drug to be
considered a bioequivalent to a listed drug if the effects of such drug and the
listed drug do not show a significant difference.172 It also would alter the
ANDA procedures by allowing a settlement, and not just a court decree, to
end the thirty-month delay imposed on generic drug companies. 173
Moreover, it would require the FDA to approve an ANDA forty-five days
after the forty-five day notice period even if the brand name company files a
lawsuit, unless the court grants a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
applicant from engaging in the commercial manufacture or sale of the drug
until the court decides its patent validity. 74 Finally, the bill would permit a
patent holder to obtain a declaratory judgment as to whether the patent that
claims the listed drug or a method of using the drug is valid or will be
infringed. 1
75
This legislation would discourage pioneer drug firms from filing
infringement lawsuits every time an ANDA is filed by expanding the means
to end the thirty-month stay on generic competition to include settlements
170. Elfin, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 157, at 749. See also Harris, supra note 69, at Al.
171. H.R. 1862, 107th Cong. (2001). The House Committee of Jurisdiction has not held hearings to exam-
ine this bill, but a companion bill, S. 812, 107th Cong. (2001), was reviewed in a Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions hearing, "Closing the Gaps in Hatch-Waxman: Assuring Greater Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals," which occurred on May 8, 2002. Testimonies are available at
http://labor.senate.gov/Hearings-2002/may2002/050802pwit/050802pwit.htm. See Adams, supra note 52, at
A24. Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, W.J. Tauzin does not support reopening the
Hatch-Waxman Act and Chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Committee has not
made this a priority issue.
172. H.R. 1862.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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and mandating ANDA approval within forty-five days after the forty-five
day notice to the brand name drug competitor unless a court intervenes with
a preliminary injunction. However, allowing settlements to end the thirty-
month stay may still permit the anticompetitive agreements about which the
FTC is concerned because brand name and generic drug companies could
carry on a lawsuit for years, then settle with an agreement that the brand
name company reimburse the generic company for the time lost in the
market. Moreover, even with the approximately ninety day ANDA approval
(at the earliest), the cost of losing an infringement suit is so high that many
generic drug companies may still delay marketing and selling their products.
This legislation also could be strengthened by requiring a patent holder to
obtain a declaratory judgment on whether the infringement claim is valid
before it can file an infringement suit against a generic drug company, as
opposed to merely permitting this action. This provision would further
discourage unmeritorious infringement claims that unnecessarily delay
making cheaper generics available to consumers. The Greater Access to
Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act would effectively promote the initial Hatch-
Waxman goal of making generic drugs more accessible to consumers.
Another bill that would help restore balance to the current Hatch-
Waxman system is the Fair Advertising and Increased Research ("FAIR")
Act, which targets excessive direct-to-consumer advertising. 176  This bill
would limit the tax deductions that pharmaceutical companies could take for
advertising expenses to the amount they deduct for research and
development costs. 177 In other words, a drug company would not be able to
deduct any amount of money spent on marketing that exceeds the aggregate
amount spent on research and development for the taxable year.
78
For example, if a company spends $110 million on advertising,
promoting or marketing FDA approved prescription drugs, but spends only
$100 million on research and development in one year, the company would
not be able to deduct $10 million of advertising expenses in that year. Any
savings resulting from this legislation would be credited to the Medicare
Trust Fund. 179
176. Fair Advertising and Increased Research Act, S. 2486, 107th Cong. (2001). See 148 CONG. REC.
S4065-01 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Senator Debbie Stabenow describing the reasoning for the
FAIR Act and stating that American taxpayers contribute about $16 billion a year to pharmaceutical research
through the National Institutes of Health and drug companies spend nearly $16 billion a year on advertising,
marketing, and promotion of prescription drugs). No congressional hearings have been held to examine this
bill.
177. S. 2486.
178. Id.
179. 48 CONG. REC. S4065-01 (daily ed. May 8, 2002) (statement of Senator Debbie Stabenow).
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Not only would this legislation discourage excessive DTC
advertising, it would also promote the initial Hatch-Waxman goal of
spurring innovative research and development of new and improved
pharmaceutical products. Rewarding the industry for ending the practice of
pouring $15.7 billion into marketing and promotional campaigns would
encourage increased research and development expenditures. 180 While the
level of funding subtracted from marketing and added to research and
development would be at the company's discretion, this bill would serve as a
powerful impetus for shifting these expenditures and restoring the emphasis
on innovation to the Hatch-Waxman system.
The final policy recommendation of providing more information to
patients and doctors on new brand name drugs is not currently included in
congressional proposals. Since the drugs most heavily prescribed by doctors
are the very same drugs that are most heavily advertised, an examination of
drug advertising practices may lead to increased patient usage of more costly
brand name drugs, even when a more affordable generic alternative is
• 181
available, needs to occur. Marketing campaigns directed at doctors also
affect drug usage. Drug marketing activities include handing out free drug
samples, citing only positive studies on the new drug, making regular visits
to physicians to ensure they prescribe brand name drugs, trips, and other
lucrative gifts.' 
82
Valuable information to counter misleading marketing could be
made available to consumers and doctors through educational efforts such as
a toll-free hotline number and a media campaign similar to the ones launched
to stop teen smoking and drug use. Public service announcements ("PSAs")
providing guidelines to consumers and doctors should emphasize the
importance of asking questions about the differences between new and older
drugs, between generics and name brand drugs, and the possibility of not
taking drugs to solve every ailment. The toll-free hotline number could
serve as a resource to get these specific questions answered in an objective,
easy-to-understand manner. In addition, establishing a system to monitor
and crack down on the unnecessary and questionable practice of providing
doctors with lucrative gifts, regular visits, constant re-supplies of free
samples, and misleading information would alleviate the intense pressure to
prescribe brand name drugs over cheaper generic equivalents. These
proposals may not end the practice of prescribing the most heavily
180. Nat'l Inst. for Health Care Mgmt., Prescription Drugs and Mass Media Advertising: 1999-2000, 5
(Nov. 2001), available at http://www.nihcm.org.
181. Id.
182. Harris, supra note 69, at Al (describing a typical interaction between a doctor and a Prilosec salesman
via computer and in person).
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advertised drugs, but it would help inform the public and doctors alike and
encourage informed decision-making.
Moreover, a reexamination of the timelines for patent terms,
extensions, and market exclusivity periods is also necessary - particularly
since when Hatch-Waxman was enacted, these numbers were arbitrarily
selected. 183 Assessing the appropriate time in a non-competitive market
necessary to compensate the pioneer drug firms, but not to deter making
generic versions available as soon as reasonably possible, is a key first step.
In making this assessment and in formulating a comprehensive reform
proposal, Congress must address the contemporary factors, such as
unprecedented advertising and accelerated prescription drug use that are
contributing to the imbalanced system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The cunning legal tactics of the pioneer drug makers have squashed
contemporary, meaningful implementation of Hatch-Waxman and ensured
that brand name drugs maintain monopolistic control over the prescription
drug market by blocking generic competition. The ANDA process, which
was designed to bring generic drugs to the market faster, has been abused by
excessive use of questionable new patent listings in the Orange Book and
related infringement lawsuits. The invalid patent listings, which do not
represent any improvement over the current patented drug, contradict the
Hatch-Waxman goal of stimulating innovative research and development.
Moreover, the infringement lawsuits often serve no other purpose than to
stave off generic competition for thirty months through the automatic stay or
through anti-competitive agreements that include payments to generic
companies in exchange for no competition.
In addition, the 180-day market exclusivity provision for the first
ANDA filer offers a mix of benefits and risks that keep generics from
utilizing it. The generic drug company may win in district court after thirty
months, but risks losing on appeal 180 days later, thereby facing huge
damages for selling its products during the market exclusivity period. The
market exclusivity period for brand name drugs can last even longer through
the Hatch-Waxman patent extensions as well as the pediatric exclusivity
provisions. Combining patent extensions with additional periods of market
exclusivity can make the DTC advertising of blockbuster drugs all the more
potent because it can dominate the airwaves for even longer, unfettered by
generic competition. Effective advertising is producing results for brand
183. Mossinghoff, supra note 17, at 2.
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name drug makers-the most frequently prescribed medications are the most
heavily advertised. Coincidentally, and perhaps consequently, prescription
drug use overall has grown exponentially over the past several years, which
is precisely why accessibility and innovation remain present-day necessities.
Neither of Hatch-Waxman's goals is being met effectively under the
current system, and with growing consumer frustration, public debate, and
congressional criticisms of pioneer drug makers, the time is ripe for
change. 84 Meaningful reform of Hatch-Waxman involves setting higher
standards for patent infringement suits, eliminating the automatic thirty-
month stay on generic competition, discouraging excessive DTC advertising,
and providing more information to patients and doctors on new brand name
drugs. The Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act and FAIR
would implement many of these recommendations and effectively reform the
system for drug approval and marketing of new drugs. Adding a provision
to educate the public and doctors alike through informative television PSAs
and print advertisements in physician publications and to end the aggressive
sales tactics that induce doctors to provide name brand drugs instead of
cheaper generic drugs would strengthen this reform.
In the next five years, the patents of several major prescription
drugs, including Claritin, Prilosec, and Glucophage, will expire.185 This may
seem to ensure significant savings to consumers who have used these drugs
on a regular basis, but if the current system is not reformed, brand name
manufacturers will continue to replace these expiring drugs with new,
successor drugs that contain little improvements but enticing DTC
advertisements. By continuing to file patents based on slightly altered
formulas, dosages or manufacturing processes, backed by a persuasive
advertising blitz and constant infringement lawsuits, pioneer drug makers
will continue to persuade consumers and physicians that the new drugs are
improved and better than generic equivalents. If Congress does nothing to
reform the Hatch-Waxman system, the biggest loser is the American public
and the entire health care system. Both innovation and accessibility will
continue to be stymied by profit-based decision-making by the
pharmaceutical industry.
184. Elfin, Pharmaceuticals, supra note 157, at 749. See N.Y. TIMES, Gaming the Drug Patent System,
June 10, 2002, at A24.
185. Taren Gron, Generics Best Years to Come, MED. AD NEWS, Oct. 1, 1999, at 7; Jerry Hirsch, Patent
Fight Delays Cheaper Drug, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2000, at Al.
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